The preliminary program for the NNWR Workshop, "Interpreting Wittgenstein" (at the University of Bergen, June 6-7), has been released.
Friday the 6th
14.00-15.15 – Marie McGinn (York)
"Internal Relations"
15.30-16.30 – Elinor Hållén (Uppsala)
"Wittgenstein, Freud, and Unconscious Intentions"
17.00-18.15 – Jean-Philippe Narboux (Bordeaux)
"An Externalist Reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty"
Saturday the 7th
10.00-11.15 – Kevin Cahill (Bergen)
"Wittgenstein and the Fate of Metaphysics"
11.30-12.30 – Karin Tan (Oslo)
TBA
13.45-15.00 – Ed Minar (Arkansas)
"The Life of the Sign: Rule-Following, Practice, and Agreement"
15.15-16.15 – Kim-Erik Berts (Åbo)
"The Mathematical Proof as a Picture of an Experiment"
16.45-18.00 – Jim Conant (Chicago)
"From the Method to Methods"
For more information, contact Richard Sørli: richard.sorli@fof.uib.no or Simo Säätelä: simo.saatela@fof.uib.no
Hopefully, audio of some of these (say, the McGinn and the Conant) will be posted on the Wittgenstein Archives' Fragments page.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
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About Me
- N. N.
- I am a doctoral student in philosophy writing a dissertation on Wittgenstein.
2 comments:
Conant's title is tantalizing.
I said I would comment on the "Philosophy" extract in "Philosophical Occasions" once I finished it -- the bit that's an extract from the Big Typescript. I suppose I ought to do what I said I would do.
I think the paragraph at the close of section 92, p.197 in "Philosophical Occasions", makes it clear that your reading of some of the disputed passages from the middle period was correct: Wittgenstein, at this point, thinks there is a method in philosophy, and it's akin to sorting papers for filing. A more scattershot approach is mentioned just to disparage it as being what one oughtn't to do. I am further convinced of this by the early version of PI§133 which occurs a page earlier: here the subsection does not include the bit about there being "methods", but not "a method", in philosophy. I am still inclined to think that this is a very noteworthy shift; the passage reads entirely differently to me depending on whether or not that sentence is there.
(These are things I thought before seeing Conant's title, but the title has reminded me that I never wrote them down anywhere.)
Daniel,
I agree that Conant's paper sounds interesting. When these workshops are held in Bergen, the talks are usually recorded and posted on the Wittgenstein Archives' Fragments page. Conant has a couple of talks posted there already, so I'm hopeful that we'll be able to listen to this one.
Wittgenstein, at this point, thinks there is a method in philosophy, and it's akin to sorting papers for filing.
I suppose that might sound a bit pedestrian, but I rather like it.
Concerning PI §133, it seems to me that the target might not be the Big Typescript but the Tractatus. It might be the case that there are many different ways to "examine things methodically," different ways to sort the papers so as to find their proper arrangement.
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